British policy in Central and South Asia is in a bit of a bind. We want stability in Afghanistan, a special relationship with India, and have signed up to a strategic partnership with Pakistan. The problem for us in achieving our goals in the region is that the latter two see a stable Afghanistan as coming at the expense of one or the other. In August, a survey of Pakistan’s foreign policy elite found that ‘there was concern about Indian activities [in Afghanistan] which could undermine Pakistan’s security and stability.’ A former Indian intelligence official has told me via email that New Delhi only seeks to stop the country from ‘coming under the malign influence of the Pakistani Army’. So can the United Kingdom enjoy friendships with all three countries despite geopolitical realities or does something have to give? This is the crux of an article I’ve been working on for the last month.
The British (and American) solution to geopolitics seems to be democratic politics, but it has a major flaw: Pakistan’s support for terrorist groups in the region is due to its rivalry with India, not the nature of its government in Islamabad or the power of the military in Rawalpindi.
In the public statements of David Cameron and William Hague, in both opposition and government, there is a false dichotomy between a democratic Pakistan which is a peaceful actor in the region and an autocratic, terrorist-supporting Pakistan. “We want to see a strong and a stable and a democratic Pakistan,” the Prime Minister said in Bangalore last July, “but we cannot tolerate in any sense the idea that [they are] allowed to look both ways” (my emphasis). There is no recognition that democracy and state sponsorship of terrorism can coexist, even though they have in the country before.
Zulfikar Bhutto waged a clandestine proxy war against Afghanistan in 1975 using Afghan exiles. The late Benazir Bhutto acquiesced to ISI-backing of the extremist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in the Afghan civil war and also supported the rise of the Taliban. In the late 1990s, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif shielded the Taliban from American pressure to hand over Osama bin Laden because of his help in Kashmir. And President Zardari is supposed to have told high-ranking Taliban prisoners last spring: “You are our people, we are friends, and after your release we will of course support you to do your operations.”
Mr. Cameron is not the only one to buy into this false dichotomy. It seems to have been the basis of the recent “memogate” scandal in Pakistan. Hussain Haqqani, the now ex-Ambassador to the United States, is alleged to have passed on a memo to Admiral Mike Mullen from the Pakistani president in which he said he would fire the Army top brass and reign in terrorist groups if the Americans protected him from a military coup. C. Christine Fair, a much respected South Asia expert, concluded a recent Foreign Affairs article with the claim that ‘the most likely path toward a stable country involves empowering Pakistan’s civilians to exert control over security and foreign policy.’
I am sceptical because it is not the nature of the Pakistani government which determines its support for terrorism, but its geopolitical rivalries, which have also been a catalyst for changes from military rule to democracy and back again. Promoting “values” and the rule of law may bring about a change in Pakistan’s official mindset eventually, but Western policymakers don’t have that kind of time.
Anjaan
December 15, 2011
The Anglo-Americans have been complicit in Pakistan’s sponsoring of terror for many decades, until they themselves had a taste of this medicine.
Therefore it is the sacred duty of the Anglo-Americans to deal with and eradicate this cancer from the face of the earth.
And given the history, India has no reason to offer a special relationship to the British, a spent force in Europe.
Aaron Ellis
December 15, 2011
It would be fairer to say that the British and Americans ‘acquiesced’ to Pakistan’s sponsoring of terrorism rather than being ‘complicit’ in it. One should keep in mind that there were good reasons for our acquiesence: we had bigger fish to fry. In the 1980s it was the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the only way the U.S. could achieve this goal was by complying with Zia ul-Haq’s demand that American assistance be channeled through the ISI. Hence ‘acquiescence’, not ‘complicity’.
How do we “eradicate this cancer from the face of the earth”, exactly, and why is it a “sacred” duty?
And the pitfalls to a special relationship with India have nothing to do with history, but are to do with a lack of common strategic interests which go beyond cultural and economic ties (as one of the largest economies in the world and the third or second largest in Europe, the United Kingdom does have quite a lot to offer here…).
Daniel Rust
March 8, 2012
It’d be nice if more IR thinkers focused on this problem. A few questions popped into my mind after reading:
What exactly is it that Pakistan has against India, anyway (aside from wars past)? As far as I know, the Qur’an only explicitly warns against Jews and less-so Christians, but not Hindus (it would be a great addition to my knowledge on the tension in the region if someone corrected me here).
If the problem is in fact Pakistan’s paranoia about Indian ‘adventurism,’ or whatever it may be – why not simply work on making their permanent leaders (generals) better educated with world-class military academies? It’s always the coup-leaders that are well-trained in economics and world affairs that outlast their peers.
I can’t recall a third question; my Iran post touched on the issues stated above as some darn good reasons why we don’t need another nuclear-tipped regional rivalry in the world.
Ed
April 5, 2012
I think the problem is that we refuse to accept the root of the problem, because it offends the conventional world view.
A significant part of Pakistan, if not a majority, view non-Muslims and in particular Hindu ‘pagans’ with contempt. Time and again we see that a significant portion of Pakistani society is Islamic-supremacist – in the riots demanding the death penalty for a Christian woman ‘blasphemer’ etc. The cognitive dissonance of the military and economic superiority of the supposedly Hindu inferiors over Pakistan leads to uncontrolled resentment and hatred.
Democracy in these conditions may help in the very long term, but in the meantime a vast, backward and ignorant electorate will simply fall under the sway of rabble-rousers and demagogic mullahs.