Since the September 13th attacks in Kabul, relations between Pakistan and the United States have become so bad that it is rumoured the baddies in the next Indiana Jones film will be the ISI, which is much more damaging to a country’s reputation than being listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. On Thursday, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused the Pakistanis of helping the Haqqani network launch the attacks: the group being a “veritable arm” of the ISI. Their response was predictably churlish, and, on the same day the Pakistani military leadership decided to not turn on the Haqqanis, contrary to U.S. demands, the rhetoric was ratcheted up in Washington. Lindsey Graham, an influential member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Fox News “all options” should be considered in dealing with Pakistan and that there would be bipartisan support in Congress for any military strikes against the country. We’re not in Kansas any more…
It is easy to dismiss SEN Graham as someone who has yet to meet a war he didn’t like: indeed, many in the foreign policy racket did so. The last thing we want to do is escalate the conflict in Afghanistan into an all out war, even if Pakistan has chosen to wage a more brazen covert campaign against the United States. Aside from the mess of that truckload of shit hitting that aeroplane turbine, there is a bigger grand strategic question: why bother? Manish Thakur, a defence analyst, rightly noted: ‘We want to leave [Afghanistan], conserve resources, rebuild [our] economy, face China.’ Is the pleasure of blowing up stuff in Islamabad and Rawalpindi really worth the bother of the day after?
My own reaction to Graham’s remarks was less derisive. Striking Pakistan is the last thing the United States wants to do, but, like with Iran, may find itself in a situation where it is the best least-worst option. The consequences need not be dire, either. I’m a believer in what the great Thomas Schelling calls ‘compellence’, using force (or the threat of force) to persuade others to do what you want. As he puts it in Arms and Influence (1966), in his brutally honest way: ‘The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy – vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.’ If any military strike was part of a coherent strategy then it may pay dividends, but what would such a strategy look like?
To begin with, the political objective behind using force would need to be water-tight. Ron Tira, the Israeli strategic thinker, has written that the point of attacking Iran is not to damage its nuclear sites, rather in provoking enough international pressure on Tehran to stop its nuclear programme. It is difficult to find as tight a political objective as this one when it comes to Pakistan. Stop supporting international terrorism? Okay, but how do you monitor that the way de-proliferation can be with a strict inspection regime? If the United States does ever decide to risk the consequences of striking Pakistan, its reasons need to go beyond the purely punitive.
If the point of a strike is managing the politics of the post-strike phase then Washington would need to do considerable diplomatic footwork beforehand, which would also be necessary for containing any blowback. They would need the acquiescence of China, Iran and Russia, which would be very hard to get, but not impossible given they all have an interest in stopping Pakistan from “wining” the war in Afghanistan. Indian support would be guaranteed, but if it wanted to do more than on the diplomatic side of things, it would be crucial for that support to be covert to avoid a general war. The United States must be seen to be The Lone Sword of Justice.
Finally, the U.S. Afghanistan policy would need to be completely remade. They would need to leave southern Afghanistan, re-arm and empower the Northern Alliance and conduct the kind of ‘counter-terror’ campaign pushed for by Vice-President Biden in the early days of the Obama administration. If Washington really wanted to deliver a further blow to the Pakistani military, it would play on anti-Pakistan feelings amongst the Quetta Shura Taliban and split them from the Haqqani network. You would need a diplomat with the genius of a Talleyrand to pull it off, but as a particular Afghanistan expert likes to justify fanciful policy proposals: it’s something we haven’t tried yet…
As prudent as this preparation to any strike would be, I think the risks of an all out war aren’t as high as people worry. Pakistan has never actually won a war to start with, and the country depends on the United States both economically and militarily. If they already have limited war-fighting capabilities, going to the mattresses with the world’s only superpower would fuck them right up. As well as deciding to not turn on the Haqqanis, the Pakistani military leadership also agreed that it would not be wise to escalate tensions with the Americans.
One cannot avoid war, Machiavelli wrote in The Prince, in his own brutally honest way: ‘it can only be postponed to the advantage of others.’ I don’t believe this dictum should be thought of as an iron rule, but as a reminder that maintaining a bad peace is not always better than fighting. We aren’t in that situation with Pakistan yet, and, as I say above, any strike would need to be a last resort. But it is important to emphasise to Islamabad and Rawalpindi that “all options” are on the table. ‘Violence is most purposive and most successful when it is threatened and not used’, Schelling continues. ‘Successful threats are those that do not have to be carried out.’ The one time the United States had Pakistan’s full cooperation was on September 13th 2001, when Richard Armitage, the deputy Secretary of State, threatened to bomb the country back into the Stone Age…
mazmhussain
September 27, 2011
It’s true that Pakistan would never be able to defeat the U.S. militarily, this much is obvious, but the possibility that the ISI and PAKMIL would not respond in some grievous manner to an act of direct military aggression is fanciful. The military establishment is still trying to exact revenge on India for events which occurred in the 1970′s, hence Mumbai and the continued funding of militant groups in Kashmir. They are for the most part brash, arrogant individuals and they have long memories, as well as resources.
If the goal of foreign policy is to settle scores and indulge in bravado Pakistan would have already been attacked for harbouring OBL (among other things), but if the goal in part is to ensure the security of ones citizenry I can’t see how attacking Pakistan would accomplish that. Fomenting “terrorism” in a country which is already a warzone is one thing, fomenting it across the world and in the West is something altogether entirely and there would undoubtedly be an impetus for the ISI to start doing that (and more retribution, death, for what exactly?)
About consensus forget about Russia, China and Iran; I think it is too confident to say even India would be enthusiastic for such an encounter, it would be likely to destabilize that country while not actually degrading the ability of the ISI to cause harm.
Benazir Bhutto said democracy would be the best revenge, if you really want to harm the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment the only real way to do this is to strengthen democratic opposition, nothing else will be effective; certainly not warfare. “Going to the mattresses” may be satisfying in the very short term but the amount of blowback would make it a fateful and disastrous decision, without much tangible gain.
RtHonJon
September 27, 2011
Surely the enemy here is not the Pakistan Government, but ISI and the generals it answers too? Military strikes would do little more than destabilise the current Government, probably in a military coup.
Covert targeted assassinations of its top Generals and ISI command would be more practical. If under their removal the Pakistani government could take control of its military again.
The thought of openly attacking the military of a nation who has close ties to terror groups and the fastest growing stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world terrifies me.
Aaron Ellis
September 27, 2011
I should emphasise again that I’m not saying striking Pakistan is what the U.S. *should* do, rather that if other policies fail they may find themselves in a situation where using force is the least worst option. To succeed, any strike would need to be part of a coherent political-military strategy, and I suggest what that may look like. Further, by emphasising to Pakistan that this option is open to them, however regrettable, and making it seem like a credible threat by planning for it, the Americans can *compel* them to do their bidding.
My preferred policy is breaking the Quetta Shura Taliban away from the Haqqanis, degrading the Haqqani-ISI nexus and negotiating a regional settlement on Afghanistan which frustrates Pakistan’s aim of “informal empire”. I’m sceptical about the idea of ‘greater democratisation’ as a solution to our problems. There is nothing in Pakistan’s history to suggest such a change would be a lasting one and the social group in Pakistan which swings elections in the West, the middle classes, supports the military and are most open to radicalisation.
matisak
September 28, 2011
You are asking tough, but important questions.
Ed
October 6, 2011
I don’t think Pakistan’s past experience with India is a good guide; then Pakistan was defeated and humiliated (especially in the Bangladesh liberation war) but not comprehensively crushed as the west could do.
Pakistan’s economy is moribund (especially compared with India) and could easily be devastated. In fact it could probably be brought to its knees merely by cutting off the aid that artificially keeps it afloat.
In particular I think the US and allies need to rebuild the credibility that has been eroded by events in Iraq and Afghanistan which has emboldened enemies from Tehran to Pyongyang. Liquidating Pakistan as any sort of military power would be an excellent means of doing so.
Blockade the ports, sink the navy, shoot the airforce out of the sky and bombard transport, industry, communications, irrigation systems etc.