The former UK representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, has written a new book about his time in the region. I’m usually sceptical of contemporary political memoirs, but I thought I’d take a chance with this one, and it arrived this morning. His views about the conflict have been trailed in The Guardian today, anyway: that whatever progress we make militarily, it is always undermined at the political level; that General McChrystal had the correct military strategy; General Petraeus ought to be ashamed of himself, however, for escalating the violence in Afghanistan. We need a coherent political strategy, says Cowper-Coles, but, ‘as long as [he] is in Kabul, the military approach will take precedence.’
Now, I’m open to argument that the military share responsibility for mistakes in Afghanistan, but, as I wrote some time ago, surely most responsibility rests with politicians and diplomats like Sir Sherard and the late Richard Holbrooke? The problems that prolong this war are political (corruption in the central government) and diplomatic (the role played by Pakistan), and in ten years the ‘civ’ side of things haven’t been able to do much about them. If the military have ‘hijacked’ policy-strategy, as some argue, then, as in the First World War, they are filling a vacuum created by weak policymakers.
deskibel
May 26, 2011
Assigning responsibility for mistakes or a portended failure in Afghanistan to military and/or political missions is probably impractical.
I don’t think that any of the interventions that have taken place since the end of the Cold War have created stable or sustainable states after the conflicts – the kind of stability that people are looking for will probably take decades to attain. In Afghanistan the conflict is still ongoing, and some argue that the region is simply not capable of stability (geographically, culturally, etc).
So in a nutshell, the biggest problem is not any mistakes by the military or political appointees; more the fact that it’s an extremely challenging situation. A challenge that may be beyond the capabilities of those involved to meet.
Aaron Ellis
May 26, 2011
No challenge is beyond the capabilities (or resources) of those involved in meeting it. It depends on whether the input is worth the outcome. That calculus will shift according to how well or how badly we’re doing, and that’s influenced by the actions of politicians, diplomats and the military. So, in the case of Afghanistan, where we’re doing badly, it is useful in asking why and who’s to blame most.
deskibel
May 26, 2011
From that perspective then, I don’t believe that those involved are capable of getting the right formula.
I’m not suggesting that they are lacking in intelligence – these people are some of the best and brightest. More the fact that some of these people have been doing this sort of thing for twenty years now, and those analysing it still don’t have the right answer. What’s needed is time. Decades of it.
Analysis is important, but I don’t think analysis of Afghanistan will help the current mission in the country.
Aaron Ellis
May 26, 2011
And you claim to be an academic!
deskibel
May 26, 2011
Have you submitted your article yet? I gather academic journals take a while to get round to getting work published.
Plus decent academic research takes time. Pull out is in 2014, right? In that time, we’ve got to find the right formula,* agree that it’s the right formula,** and then persuade the people on the ground that it’s the right formula.***
*Including dismissing all the wrong formulas.
**If an agreement is ever reached.
***If they’ll listen, or implement it correctly.
Aaron Ellis
May 26, 2011
We’ll be on our fourth or fifth war by the time I’ve finished this paper…